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Balancing Political Power: Community
Economic Development and
Institutional Design
K. Sabeel Rahman
Community Economic Development (CED) has been a central area of
focus for practitioners, clinicians, and legal scholars, emphasizing ques-
tions of community benefits, affordable housing, access to justice, and
much more. As the urban inequality crisis has continued to worsen, advo-
cacy groups and practitioners have begun to experiment with more cre-
ative approaches to social change that lie at the intersection of traditional
public-interest lawyering, social-movement organizing, and institutional
design. These innovative approaches represent a potentially valuable area
for practice and innovation in urban economic justice.
As scholars of law and social movements (including several on this
panel) have rightly noted, an increasingly important overlap exists
between strategies of legal change and grassroots organizing (e.g., Scott
Cummings, Law and Organizing'). In the community-development space,
this turn to organizing has been further nuanced by a parallel turn to gov-
ernance. In cities like Detroit, Oakland, and elsewhere, grassroots advocacy
groups have begun to propose novel governance arrangements as a way to
increase not only the substantive economic outcomes of city development
deals but also the community participation in formulating and monitor-
ing these deals. Thus, the Partnership for Working Families, for example,
has developed a community oversight board with the City of Oakland,
which empowers local constituencies to help oversee, implement, and
hold accountable developers and the city itself to meeting local benefits
benchmarks. Similarly, Detroit recently considered and narrowly rejected
a grassroots-proposed, municipal-wide community-benefits ordinance.2
While community-benefits agreements have a rightly fraught history of
legitimizing inequitable urban development, these experiments suggest a
valuable next wave of innovation that aims to create more systematic com-
munity empowerment.
This turn to institutional design and governance represents a return
in some ways to some of the more radical origins of the welfare rights
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movement, the grassroots war on poverty and the early era of commu-
nity economic development. For practitioners today, this institutionalist
turn could be crucial to redressing the problems of urban inequality. At a
systemic level, inequitable urban development is rooted in disparities of
political power-particularly between communities and developers, and
between communities and city officials. These disparities in economic and
political power interact and are especially stark in the context of urban
planning and development decisions. Efforts like the novel approaches to
community benefit agreements (CBAs) offer some valuable insights into
how social movements and practitioners can develop more systemic and
institutionalized forms of power that can influence central processes of
urban development. These insights can be adapted to a range of commu-
nity development decisions, including the problem of privatization and
governance of infrastructure, and city and regional zoning and planning
decisions.
